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CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached the 
majority, but in the interest of of decision I 
deem it advisable to call attention to the in the 
reasoning upon which the here is based and 
the reasoning of the majority in the cases of v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., 37 Cal.2d 215 P.2d , Aetna 
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 38 Cal.2d 599 P.2d 
and Garcia v. InclustTial Ace. 41 Cal.2d 689 
8 J, in all of which last eitrd eases I dissented. In the last 
eited cases the mandate of liberal construetion of the identical 
statutes here under consideration contained in Labor Code 
section 3202 was ignored by the Had this mandate 
been followed the result in the last cited cases would have 
been favorable to the disabled it this case. 
